Specifications

Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.8.00
Security Target Version 0.4, March 31, 2015
Page 44 of 49
The TOE allows users to perform SSHv2 authentication using password based authentication and allows users to
upload a public key for SSHv2 public key client authentication. The TOE’s SSHv2 implementation limits SSH
packets to a size of 256K bytes. Whenever the timeout period or authentication retry limit is reached, the TOE closes
the applicable TCP connection and releases the SSH session resources. As SSH packets are being received, the TOE
uses a buffer to build all packet information. Once complete, the packet is checked to ensure it can be appropriately
decrypted. However, if it is not complete when the buffer becomes full (256K bytes) the packet will be dropped and
the connection terminated.
The Cryptographic support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FCS_CKM.1: See Table 6 NIST SP800-56B Conformance above.
 FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Keys are zeroized when they are no longer needed by the TOE.
 FCS_COP.1(1): See Table 5 Cryptographic Functions above.
 FCS_COP.1(2): See Table 5 Cryptographic Functions above.
 FCS_COP.1(3): See Table 5 Cryptographic Functions above.
 FCS_COP.1(4): See Table 5 Cryptographic Functions above.
 FCS_HTTPS_EXT.1: The TOE supports TLS/HTTPS web-based secure administrator sessions.
 FCS_RBG_EXT.1: See Table 5 Cryptographic Functions above.
 FCS_SSH_EXT.1: The TOE supports SSHv2 interactive command-line secure administrator sessions as
indicated above.
 FCS_TLS_EXT.1: The TOE supports TLS/HTTPS web-based secure administrator sessions.
6.3 User data protection
The TOE is designed to ensure its own internal integrity as well as to protect user data from potential, unintended
reuse by clearing resources (e.g., memory) as they are allocated to create objects used in the implementation of the
TOE operations. Note that volatile memory is the primary resource involved in normal TOE execution while its
persistent storage is based on non-volatile flash memory.
When the TOE sends a network packet, it must request a buffer from the buffer pool. After using a buffer, the TOE
releases the buffer back to the buffer pool. In response to a request, the buffer pool will return a buffer and its
length, where the length is greater than or equal to that requested. The TOE will compare the length of the returned
buffer to that which it requested (the size of the packet), overwrite the returned buffer with packet data (destroying
any residual data present in the buffer), and, if the provided buffer exceeds the requested size of the packet,
overwrite any extra space with zeros (thus ensuring that no residual data can leak from the TOE).
The User data protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:
 FDP_RIP.2: The TOE always overwrites resources when allocated for use in objects.
6.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE,
except to display a message of the day banner and to permit network traffic to flow through the TOE without
identification or authentication. The network routing services that the TOE allows includes network traffic being
routed through the TOE as well as network routing protocol traffic destined to the TOE (including DNS, ARP,
ICMP, BootP, DHCP, RIP, OSPF, BGP, VRRP, VRRP-E, Multi-VRF) but does not include any management
configuration of the TOE’s network routing services. The TOE authenticates TOE Users against their user name,
password and privilege level.