Specifications

Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.8.00
Security Target Version 0.4, March 31, 2015
Page 8 of 49
This is accomplished primarily by controlling the size of all buffers, fully overwriting buffer contents, and zero-
padding of memory structures and buffers when necessary.
1.4.1.2.4 Identification and authentication
The TOE requires users to be identified and authenticated before they can use functions mediated by the TOE, with
the exception of passing network traffic in accordance with its configured switching/routing rules. It provides the
ability to both assign attributes (user names, passwords and privilege levels) and to authenticate users against these
attributes.
1.4.1.2.5 Security management
The TOE provides Command Line Interface (CLI) commands and the MLX series provides an HTTPS (utilizing
TLS v1.0) Graphical User Interface (Web GUI) to access the wide range of security management functions to
manage its security policies. All administrative activity and functions including security management commands are
limited to authorized users (i.e., administrators) only after they have provided acceptable user identification and
authentication data to the TOE. The security management functions are controlled through the use of privileges
associated with roles that can be assigned to TOE users. Among the available privileges, only the Super User can
actually manage the security policies provided by the TOE and the TOE offers a complete set of functions to
facilitate effective management since the Super User allows for complete read-and-write access to the system.
1.4.1.2.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE implements a number of features design to protect itself to ensure the reliability and integrity of its
security features.
It protects particularly sensitive data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible
even by an administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is
available (e.g., for log accountability).
Note that the TOE is a single appliance, and as such, no intra-TOE communication is subject to any risks that may
require special protection (e.g., cryptographic mechanisms).
The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes
mechanisms (i.e., verification of the digital signature of each new image) so that the TOE itself can be updated while
ensuring that the updates will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.
1.4.1.2.7 TOE access
The TOE can be configured to display a message of the day banner when an administrator establishes an interactive
session and subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity timeout value after which the inactive
session (local or remote) will be terminated.
1.4.1.2.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access or, for the MLX
series, TLS/HTTPS for Web graphical user interface access. In each case, the both integrity and disclosure
protection is ensured. If the negotiation of an encrypted session fails or if the user does not have authorization for
remote administration, the attempted connection will not be established.
The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as a log server, using TLS connections to prevent
unintended disclosure or modification of logs.
1.4.2 TOE Documentation
Brocade offers a series of documents that describe the installation of the Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family
Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.8.00 as well as guidance for subsequent use and administration of the
applicable security features. The following list of documents was examined as part of the evaluation: