Installation guide

Brocade FastIron SX, ICX, and FCX Series Switch/Router 08.0.01 Security Target Version 1.1, May 13, 2014
Page 37 of 48
evaluator is expected to follow the AGD documentation for installation and setup of each platform
either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test condition. This may include special test drivers or
tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion) should be provided that the driver
or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the TOE and its platform.
This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic
algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by the NDPP and used by the
cryptographic protocols being evaluated (IPsec, TLS/HTTPS, SSH).
The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to
achieve those objectives. These procedures include expected results. The test report (which could
just be an annotated version of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test
procedures were executed, and includes the actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative
account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a fix installed; and then a successful re-
run of the test, the report would show a 'fail' and 'pass' result (and the supporting details), and not
just the 'pass' result.
5.2.5 Vulnerability assessment (AVA)
5.2.5.1 Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)
AVA_VAN.1.1d
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1c
The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
AVA_VAN.1.1e
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and
presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.1.2e
The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify potential vulnerabilities
in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.1.3e
The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing, based on the identified potential vulnerabilities, to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential.
Component Assurance Activity:
As with ATE_IND, the evaluator shall generate a report to document their findings with respect to
this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in
ATE_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to
determine the vulnerabilities that have been found in network infrastructure devices and the
implemented communication protocols in general, as well as those that pertain to the particular
TOE. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report.
For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-
applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE_IND) to
confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector
needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. For example, if the vulnerability can be detected by
pressing a key combination on boot-up, a test would be suitable at the assurance level of the
NDPP. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for
instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.
5.3 Requirement Dependency Rationale
As can be seen in the following table all of the SFR and SAR dependencies are satisfied in this ST.