User manual

Table Of Contents
Zynq-7000 AP SoC Technical Reference Manual www.xilinx.com 774
UG585 (v1.11) September 27, 2016
Chapter 32: Device Secure Boot
32.3 Secure Boot Features
32.3.1 Non-Secure Boot State
The non-secure state is entered when the BootROM detects that the FSBL is not encrypted. In this
state the AES decryption and HMAC authentication engines are disabled and locked requiring a
power-on reset (POR) to re-enable. RSA authentication is still available in non-secure boots. All
subsequent PS images, PL configuration bitstreams, and PL partial re-configuration bitstreams must
be non-encrypted.
There is no mechanism to move from the non-secure state to the secure state, aside from power-on
reset. Any attempt to load encrypted data after non-encrypted data results in a security violation and
security lockdown.
32.3.2 Secure Boot State
The Zynq AP SoC always powers up in the secure state, only switching to the non-secure state when
the BootROM detects that the FSBL is not encrypted. In the secure state the encrypted FSBL is loaded
into the PS. The first configuration bitstream loaded into the PL must also be encrypted.
Since the encrypted FSBL loaded in a secure boot is “trusted”, it is possible to load additional
non-encrypted PS images. PL partial re-configuration bitstreams can be loaded via the PCAP or ICAP
interfaces as encrypted or non-encrypted. Subsequent PS images or PL bitstreams must use the
same key source as the FSBL, key switching is not allowed. Loading of non-encrypted images or
bitstreams after a secure boot is not recommended.
32.3.3 Security Lockdown
The PS's device configuration interface contains a security policy block that is used to monitor the
system security. When conflicting status is detected either from the PS or the PL that could indicate
inconsistent system configuration or tampering, a security lockdown is triggered. In a security
lockdown the on-chip RAM is cleared along with all the system caches. The PL is reset and the PS
enters a lockdown mode that can only be cleared by issuing a power-on reset. The following
conditions cause a security lockdown:
Non-secure boot specified in the boot image header and secure boot only eFuse is set
Enabling the JTAG chain or the ARM DAP with the JTAG chain disable eFuse set
SEU error tracking has been enabled in the PS and the PL reports an SEU error
A discrepancy in the redundant AES enable logic
Software sets the FORCE_RST bit of the Device Configuration Control register