User Guide

During the two months in the hospital, Stirling had plenty of time to look back
on some of Layforce’s less successful exploits and formulate his own ideas. His
pencilled memo to Gen. Sir Claude Auchinlek, Commander in Chief for Africa,
included the following six main points:
Hidden and Dangerous
An Introduction to the SAS
by Peter Lert
It was 1941. In a British army field hospital in North Africa, a lanky Scot
sweltered in the heat.
This was subaltern (2nd Lieutenant) David Stirling. Only 26, he came from a
long line of Scottish warrior aristocrats; the battle of Bannockburn had been
fought near his ancestral home, Stirling Castle. Before the outbreak of World
War II, the 6-foot 5-inch Stirling had been training for an assault on Mt. Everest.
Now he’d come to Africa to help fight the Germans...but he’d run into an unan-
ticipated delay.
He’d initially joined the Scots Guards, but—eager for action—he’d trans-
ferred to 8 Commando, commonly called “Layforce” after its commander, Col.
(later General) Robert Laycock. Early in the war, Layforce had made significant
inroads against the Germans in North Africa. Losses, however, had been heavy;
landing in numbers as high as 200 men at a time, Layforce units often met fierce
resistance. Now, most of Layforce had been transferred to Crete; the small
remainder was a fighting force in name only.
In the meantime, Stirling had met Jock Lewes, an Australian serving in the
Welsh Guards. Lewes had scrounged a supply of parachutes; he and Stirling
decided these would be the best way to infiltrate small units behind enemy lines,
and they started practicing parachute jumps at once. It was an unfortunate land-
ing from one of these jumps that had put Stirling in the hospital.
1
INTRODUCTION TO THE SAS
1.) The Germans would be most vulnerable along lines of communication—transport
depots, fuel and ammo dumps, and, especially, airfields.
2.) Large commando raids, such as those attempted by Layforce, made surprise unlikely.
3.) Small units would be more efficient, particularly if they could be placed stealthily
behind enemy lines.
4.) These units would be trained in parachuting, infiltration techniques by land and
sea, and “scrounging”—“Why carry hundreds of pounds of weapons and ammu-
nition into enemy areas when you can steal them from the enemy once you’re
there?”
5.) Given the scarcity of military resources, the proposed units would be self-sufficient
in terms of planning, training, and—to the greatest possible extent—supply of
weapons and equipment.
6.) Finally, Stirling’s proposed units would be ready for combat by November of 1941.