Open System Services Shell and Utilities Reference Manual (G06.27+, H06.04+)
Administrator Commands and Files dnssec_lwresd(8)
NAME
lwresd - Starts the secure BIND 9 lightweight resolver demon
SYNOPSIS
/etc/dns_secure/lwresd
[ -C config_file ]
[ -d debug_level ]
[ -f ]
[ -g ]
[ -n ncpus ]
[ -P port1 ]
[ -p port2 ]
[ -s ]
[ -t directory ]
[ -T tcpip_process_name ]
[ -u user ]
[ -v ]
FLAGS
-C config_file Use config_file as the resolver configuration file instead of the default,
/etc/resolv.conf. To ensure that reloading the configuration file continues to
work after the server has changed its working directory because of a possible
directory option in the configuration file, config_file should be an absolute path-
name.
-d debug_level Set the server’s debug level to debug_level. Debugging traces from lwresd
become more verbose as the debug level increases.
-f Run the server in the foreground (that is, do not run as a demon).
-g Run the server in the foreground and force all logging to stderr.
-n ncpus Create ncpus worker threads to take advantage of multiple processors. If not
specified, lwresd tries to determine the number of processors present and create
one thread per processor. If it is unable to determine the number of processors, a
single worker thread is created.
-P port1 Listen for lightweight resolver queries on port port1. If this flag is not specified,
the default is port 921.
-p port2 Send DNS lookups to port port2. If this flag is not specified, the default is port
53.
This flag provides a way of testing the lightweight resolver server with a name
server that listens for queries on a nonstandard port number.
-s Write memory usage statistics to stdout on exit.
This option is mainly of interest to BIND 9 developers and might be removed or
changed in a future release.
-t directory Make the specified directory the current directory after processing the command
line arguments, but before reading the configuration file.
Caution: This option should be used in conjunction with the -u option, because
changing the root directory for a process running as the super ID does not
enhance security on most systems; the way chroot() is defined allows a process
with root user privileges to escape a chroot jail.
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