Installation guide

Motorola WS5100 Wireless Switch and RFS7000 RF Switch Security Target
Page 38 of 85
Application Note: The TOE IT environment must provide reliable time stamps (for example: an NTP server).
It is also acceptable for the TOE to satisfy this requirement by providing its own time stamp.
5.4 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE are the assurance components of Evaluation
Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) augmented with ALC_FLR.2 (Flaw Remediation). The components are
taken from Part 3 of the Common Criteria. None of the assurance components are refined. The
assurance components are listed in Table 5-5 Assurance Components below. The components
meet or exceed the requirements of WLANAS PP.
Table 5-5 Assurance Components
Assurance class Assurance components
ACM_AUT.1 Partial CM automation
ACM_CAP.4 Generation support and acceptance procedures
Configuration management
ACM_SCP.2 Problem tracking CM coverage
ADO_DEL.2 Detection of modification
Delivery and operation
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADV_FSP.2 Fully defined external interfaces
ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
Development
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
Life cycle support
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: high-level design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Tests
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Vulnerability assessment AVA_MSU.2 Validation of analysis